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ABSTRACT
Shull, Andrew M. M.S.E., Purdue University, May 2013. Analysis of Cyberattacks
on Unmanned Aerial Systems. Major Professor: Inseok Hwang.
With the increasing power and convenience offered by the use of embedded systems
in control applications, such systems will undoubtedly continue to be developed and
deployed. Recently, however, a focus on data-centric systems and developing network-
enabled control systems has emerged, allowing for greater performance, safety, and
resource allocation in systems such as smart power grids and unmanned military
aircraft. However, this increase in connectivity also introduces vulnerabilities into
these systems, potentially providing access to malicious parties seeking to disrupt the
operation of those systems or to cause damage. Given the high potential cost of a
failure in these systems in terms of property, sensitive information, and human safety,
steps need to be taken to secure these systems. In order to analyze the vulnerabilities
of unmanned aerial systems (UASs) specifically, a simulation testbed is developed
to perform high-fidelity simulations of UAS operations using both software models
and the actual vehicle hardware. Then, potential attacks against the control system
and their corresponding intents are identified and introduced into these simulations.
Failure conditions are defined, and extensive simulation of attacks in different com-
binations and magnitudes are performed in both software and hardware in order to
identify particularly successful attacks, including attacks that are difficult to detect.
From these results, vulnerabilities of the system can be determined so that appro-
priate remedies can be designed. Additionally, stealthy false data injection attacks
against linear feedback systems are considered. The identification of these attacks is
formed as an optimization problem constrained by the ability of monitoring systems
to detect the attack. The optimal attack input is then determined for an example ap-
xiii




As unmanned aerial systems (UASs) have become more prevalent, they are in-
creasingly being included in larger computer networks, giving system designers and
end-users greater access to data and more ways to interact with and use their systems.
Unfortunately, this increased accessibility also increases the ability of malicious third
parties to gain access to these systems. This was clearly demonstrated by recent re-
ports that the control system computers for military UASs at Creech Air Force Base
were corrupted with malware as well as reports that unidentified foreign agents were
able to gain complete command and control capability of NASA and USGS Earth
observation satellites in 2008 through internet-connected ground control stations lo-
cated outside the US [1,2]. These incidents are examples of attacks on cyber-physical
systems, which are systems in which there is a tight coupling between the discrete
dynamics of computing resources and the continuous dynamics of an underlying phys-
ical system. Such attacks, when successful, have high potential economic, strategic,
and human costs associated with them due to both the sensitivity of the applications
and the danger associated with a failure in the underlying physical system [3,4].
If an attacker were to compromise a UAS, the consequences could be disastrous.
When an individual UAS is compromised, it may fail to complete a potentially vital
mission, such as active combat, combat support, military or law enforcement surveil-
lance, fire fighting, or wilderness search and rescue. A compromised UAS may also
leak intelligence information, as was the case in 2009 when Iraqi militants gained ac-
cess to live video feeds from US military UASs [5]. Finally, a compromised UAS poses
a significant threat to human life and property if the attacker accesses any onboard
weapon systems or uses the vehicle itself as a kinetic weapon. These dangers are am-
2plified when multiple UASs are formed into a network. As more vehicles are added
to the network, the number of vulnerabilities that an attacker can exploit increases
and the communication links formed between the nodes of this network provide new
avenues of attack [6].
Given the many avenues of attack and the high cost of failure, it is important
that the security of a UAS is considered in the design process. However, attempting
to analyze UAS vulnerabilities is a daunting task. Ensuring the security of a cyber-
physical system requires analysis of the many interactions between the digital and
physical components of that system, which can be very complex. Additionally, each
UAS design is physically unique. The dynamics of the underlying physical system will
be highly dependent on the mass properties, propulsion system, sensors, actuators,
control system, and aerodynamics of the vehicle. These unique dynamics contribute
to the system’s response to a cyberattack on the control system, and accordingly
contribute to the vulnerabilities of that specific vehicle. This makes a generalized
protection system difficult to implement. A detailed study of UAS cyberattack vul-
nerabilities at this level has not been conducted previously due to the considerable
scope of the problem and the lack of a well-defined measure of attack severity.
1.2 Problem Definition
A traditional computer science approach to UAS cybersecurity focuses on tech-
niques such as restricting system access and encrypting sensitive data [7]. While this
is a key component to ensuring the security of cyber-physical systems, it only pro-
tects the computing resources of the system. It is important that in addition this, the
overall system is designed so as to minimize the risk should these traditional security
approaches fail to restrict access to the system. To that end, the problem of UAS
cybersecurity is considered here from a complimentary control systems perspective.
The first part of this thesis seeks to identify which modifications a sophisticated
attacker with sufficient access would make to a UAS in order to have the greatest
3negative impact. These modifications are identified by performing high-fidelity sim-
ulations in both software and hardware of the operations and flight of a UAS that
is being subjected to a wide range of cyberattacks. In this analysis, it is presumed
that an attacker has already compromised the integrity of the computing system and
has the ability to make arbitrary modifications to some system components. The
severity of these attacks are then measured by the time it takes to introduce failure,
and particularly dangerous attacks are identified.
This is effectively a form of reachability analysis. Reachability analysis seeks to
determine the set of states that a system can possibly reach within a given time
window under the set of admissible inputs. If there is a known set of states that
are undesirable or unsafe, this analysis can be used to determine if it is possible for
the system to reach that set of states. This analysis is widely used in analyzing the
safety of complex systems [8–10]. In this research, the reachable set is approximated
using numerical simulation under a range of identified cyberattack inputs, and the
successful attacks are identified by determining which attacks have reachable sets that
intersect a set of unsafe failure states. These attacks can then be further analyzed to
determine which ones are particularly successful at introducing failure.
By identifying these particularly effective attacks, system vulnerabilities are dis-
covered. These discoveries can be fed back into the design process, allowing designers
to create a more resilient system. Applying this strategy in conjunction with the
traditional cybersecurity analysis results in a system that attempts to both deny at-
tackers access and restrict what can be accomplished with access should an attack
be able to obtain it. This comprehensive approach represents a coupling of com-
puter security analysis and control system safety analysis in much the same way that
cyber-physical systems couple the discrete dynamics of computing systems with the
continuous dynamics of a physical system.
The second part of this thesis investigates false data injection attacks on linear
Gaussian systems. A false data injection attack is an attack in which the attacker is
able to arbitrarily change some or all of the measurements made by the system. This
4type of attack has been identified as particularly interesting in part because of the
comparative ease with which it can be performed. An attacker may not be able to
directly manipulate system configurations such as controller gains or state estimates
due to access restrictions, memory protection, or other successful computer security
policies. Measurement data, however, is often gathered from an external source and
may not be as easily protected. This is especially true for remote sensors which
report measurements over a data network. This configuration lends itself to network-
based attacks, direct physical manipulation of a remote sensor, or manipulation of
the environment to change the measurement. Given the noise inherent in sensor
measurements, it can also be difficult to distinguish valid measurements from modified
measurements.
The formation of optimal false data attacks on linear systems using Kalman filter
state estimates to implement feedback is also investigated. This is done by formulating
an optimization problem that seeks to determine the attack input that maximizes the
error of the system state relative to the nominal state trajectory. This optimal attack
input is constrained by the requirement that the attack should not cause monitoring
systems to identify a fault condition, as doing so would alert the user to the presence
of the attack and permit the implementation of a mitigation policy.
In both analyses, the focus is on identifying attacks which are able to either
degrade system performance without being detected by mitigation systems or are
able to introduce failure before detected by monitoring systems. Detection permits
the implementation of a mitigation policy and alerts the user to the presence of the
attack, both of which are considered to be detrimental to the attacker’s objectives.
1.3 Organization
Chapter 2 will overview previous research on the security of cyber-physical systems
as well as false data injection attacks. Chapter 3 will present the simulation testbed
used this analysis, including both the vehicle models and the hardware and software
5used in the simulation. The cyberattack models, intents, and metrics are presented
in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 presents the results of the cyberattack simulations using
both the software and hardware testbeds and discusses the general vulnerabilities
identified through this analysis. Chapter 6 develops the optimization problem used
to determine the optimal false data attack inputs, and presents the results of its
application to an example system. Conclusions are given in Chapter 7, and additional
interesting software simulation results are presented in Appendix A.
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62. PREVIOUS RESEARCH
2.1 Security of Cyber-Physical Systems
The security of cyber-physical systems has been a growing focus of research as
these systems are increasingly used in applications, such as embedded medical de-
vices, building control systems, and UASs [3]. There has been considerable research
into the security vulnerabilities of general cyber-physical systems [4, 16–18] as well
as specific applications such as smart electric power grids [19, 20]. Cyber-physical
systems have also been studied in the context of traditional cybersecurity threats and
methods, including network requirements for reliable and secure sensor communica-
tion in control networks [21], replay and denial-of-service attacks on control system
computers [22,23], intrusion monitoring in process control networks [24], and a game
theory approach to analyzing security investments in networked control systems [25].
While these approaches do contribute to the security of these systems, they do not,
in general, address how to identify the control system vulnerabilities of a specific sys-
tem. UAV security is specifically addressed and potential vulnerabilities are identified
in [26] as well as in [11], which presents the early results of the simulation analysis
presented here.
The use of reachability analysis in establishing the safety of hybrid and other
systems, including unmanned aircraft, has been well established [8–10]. This analysis
has also recently been applied to the security of cyber-physical systems, with a general
framework being presented in [27]. Reachability analysis was also used to determine
whether a cyberattack would be able to introduce unsafe behavior in a power system
in [28] and was used in [29] to evaluate the efficacy of an undetectable false data
injection attack on a sensor network.
72.2 False Data Injection Attacks
Much of the analysis of control system security in cyber-physical systems has
focused on the effects of manipulating sensor measurements to the detriment of the
system, with particular emphasis on the sensors and state estimators in electric power
grids and smart grid systems. This analysis was initially motivated by the work of Liu
et al. who noted that by intelligently choosing which remote terminals to compromise
in an electric power grid, an unobservable attack on the weighted least squares esti-
mate of the grid state estimator could be formed. Specifically, the attacked estimate
was formulated as an offset to the correct estimate, as in Equation (2.1), and the
attack input vector was formulated as a function of that offset, as in Equation (2.2).
xˆa [n] = xˆ [n] + c (2.1)
za [n] = z [n] + a [n]
a [n] = Hc
(2.2)
If an attack can be found that satisfies these equations, then norm of the residual in
the attacked case is equal to the residual norm in the nominal case.
‖z [n]−Hxˆ [n]‖ = ‖za [n]−Hxˆa [n]‖
= ‖z [n] + Hc−Hxˆ [n]−Hc‖
(2.3)
If the system implements a bad data detection scheme based on the norm of the
residual, the attacked estimate and measurements would not be distinguishable from
the nominal values. The attack would therefore be undetectable as long as the nominal
case would not trigger a fault condition. It was shown that any nonzero attack vector







a [n] = 0 (2.4)
The feasibility of this attack is a function of how many sensors have been corrupted,
with it being shown that if sufficiently many sensors are compromised, an attack is
guaranteed to exist [30,31].
8This work motivated significant research into false data attacks, with much of
it focused on false data injection systems on weighted least squares estimators in
power grid systems, including attack formation [32–35], protection schemes [36], and
how such attacks can be used to manipulate the electricity commodity market for
profit [37]. In addition to analysis of these attacks on power grids, there is analysis of
this type of attack on general sensor networks [29, 38], and general feedback systems
[39]. The work presented in Chapter 6 is an extension of the work by Liu et al. into
false data injection attacks on α − β filters used for state estimation in air traffic
control [40].
The analysis of false data injection attacks has also been extended to the problem
of multi-agent consensus, in which there can be malicious or faulty members of vehicle
network that will report false data to other members of the network. The case of a
malicious agent inserting data is an example of the Byzantine general problem. This
is a type of problem similar to the hypothetical case in which a Byzantine general
has sent a coded message to his field commanders, and those commanders must
then collaboratively decode the message and agree on its content. If some of the
commanders are traitors, they may try to manipulate the decoding process to change
the final interpretation of the message content. If, for example, the message was to
launch a sneak attack at midnight, the traitors may try to change the command to
launch a sneak attack at dawn, giving the opposing army additional time to prepare
for the battle. The problem is therefore to ensure that loyal commanders correctly
interpret the message in spite of the bad advice of the traitorous commanders [41].
This problem is applicable to various cyber-physical systems, such as groups of
independent UASs that need to agree on the value of some parameter (a general
consensus problem), coordinate arrival timing (a rendezvous problem), or coordinate
their relative positions (a formation control problem). If one or more of these UASs
are compromised by an attacker, they may then be able to modify the final value that
is converged to or prevent convergence altogether, thereby disrupting the operation
9of the group. Investigations into the security of such networks, with a primary focus
on the identification and exclusion of offending agents, are performed in [42–46].
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3. SIMULATION TESTBED
This chapter gives an overview of the simulation testbed used to perform the attack
simulation as well as the vehicle model used in this analysis. This overview is sepa-
rated into two main components describing the software-in-the-loop (SIL) simulation
and the hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) simulation, respectively. Each description is fur-
ther organized into an overview of the software and tools used and an overview of
the autopilot and vehicle system for each configuration. The attack models will be
described in Chapter 4.
Figure 3.1.: The Purdue Hybrid Systems Lab Simulation Process [13]
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Figure 3.1 illustrates the general analysis process for the unmanned vehicles in
the lab for both hardware and software simulation.
3.1 Software-in-the-Loop Simulation
SIL testing simulates UAS operations using a purely software model of both the
system and the environment. Varying degrees of fidelity are possible with this type
of simulation depending on the detail of the model. Because the development of a
software model requires an abstraction of the system behavior away from the hardware
implementation, testing performed through this type of simulation will generally be
considered a test of the design of the system and not of the implementation. This
testbed in particular uses a block diagram model of the autopilot in ScicosLab, a
simulation environment similar to Simulink, to model the control systems, resulting
a design-level analysis that has abstracted away much of the discrete dynamics of the
embedded computing system. These discrete dynamics are accounted for by using
the HIL simulation described in Section 3.2. The HIL simulation is more complex
and will generally take longer to perform, so it is beneficial to perform initial analysis
in software to identify interesting results and then verify those results using hardware
simulation.
3.1.1 SIL Software and Tools
The testbed used for this analysis integrates several software packages and toolkits,
as summarized in Table 3.1. There is a focus on using open source software throughout
the simulation, as this provides both the greatest flexibility in modifying existing code
to fit the simulation needs and in redistributing developed software for use by other
researchers.
The testbed uses JSBSim, an open source six degree-of-freedom flight dynamics
modeler written in C++ to simulate the flight of the vehicle. JSBSim uses the dy-
namics equations and aerodynamic descriptions of aircraft, including lookup tables of
12
Table 3.1: Software Used in Software-in-the-loop Simulation
Software Package Functionality
JSBSim Flight dynamics modeler
FlightGear Vehicle visualization
USAF Datcom Vehicle aerodynamics modeling
ScicosLab Block diagram modeling and simulation environment
arktools Guidance, navigation, and control blocks and
Scicoslab interface to JSBSim
python Scripting and automation of simulation
matplotlib Plot generation
aerodynamic and propulsion characteristics, to propagate the vehicle state. A wide
variety of vehicle types can be simulated using JSBSim, including fixed wing aircraft,
rotor craft, gliders, and rockets. More than fifty different officially supported vehicle
descriptions are available, with the models being derived from publicly available per-
formance and geometry information [47]. The aerodynamic description used in this
analysis is derived from wind tunnel testing to characterize the test vehicle as well
as USAF Digital DATCOM models of the vehicle. The trim state for this model was
determined using a simplex-based JSBSim trimming algorithm [12]. Visualization
of the vehicle is provided using FlightGear, an open source flight simulator that is
widely supported [48].
The autopilot modeling is done in ScicosLab [49]. Significant functionality in
this environment was provided by the Autonomous Robotics Kit Tools (arktools).
This toolkit provides many useful blocks for Scicoslab, including a JSBSim interface,
magnetic models, dynamic equations, and guidance and control blocks [50].
Scripting, automation, and data management to enable long-running simulation
with many iterations, such as the exhaustive attack combination testing performed
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in this analysis are all performed using custom python and ScicosLab scripts. Plot
generation is performed using the matplotlib python library.
3.1.2 SIL Vehicle and Autopilot Models
Aircraft Model
The vehicle model used in this analysis is the Multiplex Easystar, shown in Fig-
ure 3.2. This vehicle is widely used by researchers and hobbyists due to its reliability
and low cost. While this analysis is focused on this vehicle specifically, the testbed
is designed to easily accommodate different aircraft models, as noted previously, al-
lowing for easy analysis of many different vehicles. The Easy Star has elevators and
rudders on the tail of the aircraft for control, but does not have aerilons.
Figure 3.2.: Multiplex Easy Star Aircraft
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Controller Model
The control signals for actuators on the vehicle are generated using digital PID
controllers. This vehicle uses a backside control strategy, in which the elevator is used
to control the velocity and the throttle is used to control the altitude. The elevator
controls velocity by controlling the angle of attack, allowing this strategy to work at
both high and low flight speeds. In contrast, a frontside control strategy uses the
throttle for velocity and the elevator for altitude. This approach is more complicated
to implement in a control system due to a gain reversal on the back side of the power









































































Figure 3.3.: The Digital Controller Model in ScicosLab.
The controller model is shown in Figure 3.3. In this model, the altitude, velocity,
yaw rate, bearing, and bank angle command error are fed into a bank of digital PID
controllers. Because there are no ailerons on the Easystar, the output of the PID
controller for the yaw rate, bearing, and bank angle are mixed into the single rudder
input. The controller outputs are then added to the trim values for each actuator
to give the commanded position for each actuator. These commanded positions are
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then passed through saturation blocks to limit their value to within the acceptable
range for the design before being sent to the actuators.
Navigation Subsystems
The navigation system in the model is a standard strapdown inertial navigation
system, in which the integration of inertial sensors are used with an extended Kalman
filter to provide a state estimate with periodic corrections using GPS and magnetome-
ter measurements [52, 53]. The models of the navigator dynamics, IMU, GPS, and
extended Kalman filter subsystems were developed by Goppert et al. in [13, 15], on
which the author of this thesis was co-author, but did not directly contribute to the
development of these models. These publications can be referrenced for further detail.
Fault Detection
Fault detection systems are used on many UASs to determine when a failure has
occurred so that corrective action can be attempted. While many of these systems
were designed to detect hardware failures, they can also be used to detect abnormal
behavior caused by a cyberattack. For this system, fault detection is performed by
testing the assumption that the Kalman filter residuals, yGPS and ymag, are normally
distributed with a known covariance. Specifically, a fault can be detected by testing
the contradictory hypothesis shown in Equations (3.1) and (3.2).
H0 : ymag ∼ N (0,Smag) and H1 : ymag /∼N (0,Smag) (3.1)
H2 : yGPS ∼ N (0,SGPS) and H3 : yGPS /∼N (0,SGPS) (3.2)
If H0 and H2 are true, then the residual powers, y>magS-1magymag and y>GPSS-1GPSyGPS,
will have a χ2 distribution. These hypotheses can therefore be tested by comparing
the value of these residual powers to a threshold value, τ , which can be calculated
to provide an acceptable accuracy or can be determined experimentally. If either
of these hypotheses is rejected, then the corresponding opposing hypothesis, H1 or
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H3, is accepted. This indicates that the measured state evolution does not conform
to expectations, and a fault state is detected [54, 55]. For a small system like the
Easystar, there are limited resources for fault identification or mitigation, so when a
fault state is triggered, the system reverts to the constant, open-loop trim inputs in
an attempt to maintain normal flight. At that point, the operator can be signaled to
intervene and attempt to restore operations.
ADS-B Modeling
ADS-B stands for Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast. This is a method
of sharing data among aircraft in a vicinity through mutual information broad-
casts [56]. A major use of ADS-B is the broadcast of navigation information so
that neighboring aircraft are able to maintain safety, including minimum separation
distances, in crowded airspace. ADS-B is not used in the hardware-in-the-loop test-
ing.
In this analysis, we focus on the navigation information in the ADS-B broadcast.
This includes the position and velocity of the aircraft. Other services exist for weather,
terrain, and general flight information.
Table 3.2: ADS-B Packet Information
Position latitude, longitude, altitude
Velocity north, east and down velocities
Time Stamp date and time of broadcast
Collision Avoidance Algorithm
Simple collision avoidance was achieved using the velocity of the vehicle relative
to the obstacle to move the obstacle into a static reference frame. Then the only
requirement for avoiding collision is that the relative velocity be shifted such that it
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will not violate the separation distance [57]. The variables used for these calculations
are defined in Table 3.3.
Table 3.3: Collision Avoidance Variables
Variable Physical Meaning
Ψc Bearing to obstacle from vehicle
Ψv/o Bearing of vehicle commanded velocity relative to obstacle
Ψr Required Ψv/o to maintain separation
rc Distance to obstacle
rs Separation distance
α Difference between Ψv/o and Ψc
β Magnitude difference in bearing between a collision course and
a course tangent to the separation window
γ Change in Ψv/o required for vehicle path to be tangent to
separation window
The initial commanded bearing, Ψv will always be chosen to point directly to-
wards the commanded waypoint. If this bearing will cause the vehicle to violate the
separation distance at any point in the future, a desired vehicle velocity relative to
the obstacle will be calculated as in Equation (3.3).
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γ = sgn (α) (β − α)
Ψr =

−Ψc, if rc ≤ rs, |α| ≥ pi2




, if rc ≤ rs, |α| < pi2 , α ≥ 0
Ψv/o + γ, if rc > rs, |α| < β
Ψv/o, otherwise
(3.3)
The angle β is calculated using trigonometric operations on a right triangle formed
with the distance to the obstacle, rc, as the hypotenuse and the radius of the circle
and vehicle path tangent to the separation window forming the legs. If the vehicle is
within the separation window, this triangle cannot be formed and β is undefined. In
this case, the relative velocity vector is chosen to be orthogonal to a collision course
vector if the vehicle is in front of the obstacle and inside the separation window,
and is chosen to point directly away from the obstacle if the vehicle is behind the
obstacle and inside the separation window. If the separation distance is not violated,
the direction of the relative velocity vector will be rotated such that it is tangent
to the separation window in the case that the current relative velocity intersects the
separation window. Collision avoidance is not implemented on the hardware model
given the difficulty of including ADS-B and other sense and avoid systems on a small,
resource-constrained system such as the EasyStar.
Subsystem Integration
These system components are then integrated together to give a complete vehi-
cle autopilot, shown in Figure 3.4. In this diagram, the commands block provides
the commanded waypoint and velocity to the vehicle, and the waypoint guidance
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block then uses this information combined with information about nearby obstacles
to compute a desired bearing and speed for the aircraft. The backside controller block
implements digital PID controllers to regulate the error in the control surfaces. The
controller in this analysis was updated at 50 Hz, which is the typical update rate
for hobby servos commonly used on research UASs. The servos block models the lag
in the actuators using a first order approximation. The JSBSimComm block sends
the actuator signals to JSBSim where the aircraft state derivative is computed. The
ScicosLab block then uses a variable step size integration scheme for propagating the
state. The computed state and outputs from the JSBSimComm block are then sent
to the sensor models. The sensor models use the state of the aircraft and random
noise generation to simulate realistic data from the sensors. This data is then fed

































Figure 3.4.: Top-Level SIL Autopilot Model
3.2 Hardware-in-the-Loop Simulation
HIL testing simulates UAS operations using the actual autopilot hardware and
corresponding software, by simulating flight on a PC and then generating sensor
measurements or state data and sending it to the vehicle. Because the actual vehicle
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system is used in the testing, this is an implementation-level analysis, and includes
the full discrete dynamics of the autopilot, including effects such as race conditions,
limitations on computational resources, task prioritization, timing delay, jitter, and
resource locking, which are extremely difficult to include into software models of the
autopilot. This higher-fidelity in the simulation gives a more accurate view of the
effects of cyberattacks, and, accordingly, this type of analysis is preferable. This
fidelity does have an associated cost, however. HIL simulation must be performed
in real-time, resulting in a longer-running simulation. HIL testing capability must
be written into the autopilot software, specifically the ability to multiplex sensor
input between the simulated and real measurements and multiplex the servo output
between the simulated and real actuators. The complexity of using the full software
autopilot can also make it much more difficult to inject and manage the simulated
cyberattacks, adding additional overhead to the testing. HIL simulation may therefore
not always be feasible, and is best used in analyzing the effects of attacks that have
been previously been identified as effective.
3.2.1 HIL Software and Tools
The tools used in the HIL component of the testbed are summarized in Table 3.4.
As with the SIL simulation, there is a focus on using open source software due to
its extensibility and the ability to make developments publicly available in order to
aid other researchers, as well as the considerably lower cost relative to proprietary
autopilot systems.
Throughout the discussion of HIL testing, the term software autopilot will be used
in reference to the software used on an autopilot system, the term hardware autopilot
will be used in reference to the computing hardware and sensors on which the software
autopilot runs, and the autopilot in the context of HIL testing will be used in reference
to the combined software and hardware autopilot. The software autopilot used in this
testbed is the open source PX4 autopilot software and the accompanying PX4 Flight
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Table 3.4: Software Used in Hardware-in-the-loop Simulation
Software Package Functionality
JSBSim Flight dynamics modeler
FlightGear Vehicle visualization
USAF Datcom Vehicle aerodynamics modeling
PX4 Software Autopilot Open source autopilot software
PX4FMU Open source autopilot hardware
QGroundControl Open source ground control software
MAVLink Communication protocol for micro air vehicles
python Scripting and automation of simulation
pymavlink MAVLink protocol library
matplotlib Plot generation
Management Unit (FMU) hardware autopilot is used. This project has been largely
developed by the PIXHAWK Research Project at ETH Zurich, with contributions
from many other sources [58]. The FDC/HS Lab at Purdue contributed significantly
to this project through the development of an EKF-based navigation system.
The PX4 FMU hardware includes a 168 MHz Cortex M4F ARM processor, 196
KB RAM, and 1 MB Flash, making it one of the most powerful open source autopilots
currently available. The onboard sensors include a 3D accelerometer, 3D gyro, 3D
magnetometer, and a barometer. The PX4 software autopilot uses the open source
NuttX real-time operating system (RTOS), which is fully preemptible with FIFO
or round-robin scheduling and support for functionality such priority inheritance,
task controls, named message queues, counting semaphores, clocks/timers, signals,
threads, and task management [59].
Two types of HIL testing, state-level and sensor-level are supported by the PX4
autopilot. State-level HIL testing provides simulated state information to the vehicle,
bypassing the navigation system and giving a lower-fidelity simulation. This type
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Figure 3.5.: HIL Simulation Setup
of testing is also of reduced complexity and uses fewer computational resources and
bandwidth. Sensor-level HIL testing generates simulated sensor measurements that
are sent to the vehicle and used by the navigation system to generate a state estimate.
This is a higher-fidelity simulation in that the navigation system is also tested, but is
more complex and requires greater computational resources and bandwidth. In the
context of security analysis, sensor-level HIL testing is much more beneficial, as many
of the attacks identified in Chapter 4 target the sensors and navigation system. The
effects of such attacks are not measurable in state-level testing, and so, accordingly,
sensor-level testing is used in this analysis.
In the Purdue HIL testbed, the dynamics modeling, aerodynamic models, and
vehicle visualization are all performed using JSBSim, USAF DATCOM, and Flight-
Gear, as in the SIL simulation described in Section 3.1.1. A python script is used to
interface with JSBSim and retrieve the vehicle state. From this state, the relevant sim-
ulated sensor measurements are generated with additive noise. These measurements
are sent to the autopilot using MAVLink, an open source communication protocol for
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Figure 3.6.: HIL Simulation Data Flow
micro air vehicles (MAVs) with builtin support for HIL testing messages [60]. The
MAVLink messages are generated using the pymavlink python library. These sensor
measurements are then used by the navigator to update the state estimate. The con-
troller outputs are then sent from the autopilot to the python script, which updates
the actuator position in JSBSim. This data flow is shown in Figure 3.6.
3.2.2 HIL Vehicle and Autopilot Models
The same aircraft and aerodynamic models were used in this HIL testing as in
the SIL testing. Additionally, the navigation system in the PX4 autopilot was by the
FDC/HS Lab at Purdue and closely resembles the navigator used in the SIL model
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described in Section 3.1.2 and [13, 15]. An identical control architecture is also used
in both simulations, although the update rate for the HIL testing is modified to fit
the resources of the hardware autopilot and the availability of sensor data.
The HIL model differs from the SIL model in that ADS-B message and collision
avoidance are not implemented, as the hardware autopilot does not have any capabil-
ity to receive these messages or to sense and avoid other aircraft. Additionally, while
a fault detection system identical to the one described in Section 3.1.2 is implemented
in the software autopilot, it is not used in this analysis, as a way of decreasing the
simulation complexity and saving computation resources for the CPU-intensive task
of parsing and preparing the HIL testing messages.
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4. ATTACK MODELS
This chapter presents the attack models used in both the SIL and HIL testing. The
attacks considered are not traditional cyberattacks, such as replay or denial-of-service
attacks, but rather are modifications that can be made to control systems components
in order to affect vehicle operations. In this analysis, it is presumed that some subset
of the UAS computing resources have already been compromised by a cyberattacker,
and this attacker has gained the ability to make arbitrary modifications to control
system components. The goal is then to identify which modifications have the greatest
negative impact on vehicle operations and accordingly represent the optimal attack.
Once these vulnerabilities are identified, that knowledge can be included in the design
process to give a more resilient system.
4.1 Cyberattack Measures
4.1.1 Attack Intent Classification
In order to help identify failure metrics, the potential cyberattacks are classified
by the attacker’s intent. The three intents that have been identified are mission
obstruction, control acquisition, and vehicle destruction.
Mission Obstruction
In a mission obstruction attack, the attacker aims to prevent the UAS from com-
pleting the assigned mission objectives. This can be accomplished using several meth-
ods. For example, the vehicle can be delayed such that the time requirement of the
mission is not met, or the vehicle can be forced to waste so much fuel or battery
power that the mission objectives are no longer feasible. Unpredictable errors could
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also be inserted into the navigation system in order to degrade the state awareness
of the vehicle. Another possibility is that the control system could be corrupted to
the point that its sensors begin to perform poorly, introducing issues such as highly
oscillatory motion. One example that is considered leverages the vehicle’s collision
avoidance system to obstruct the vehicle. By inserting a phantom vehicle in the path
of the target vehicle, an attacker can cause the target vehicle to perturb its flight
path in order to avoid collision. It should be noted that in a mission obstruction
attack, the attacker does not have the ability to control the vehicle directly or does
not attempt to do so. If the attacker can control the system directly, it would be
considered a control acquisition attack.
Control Acquisition
In a control acquisition attack, the objective of the attacker is to assume direct
control of the vehicle. An example of this would be the use of GPS spoofing to shift
the flight path of the UAS to suit the purposes of an attacker. For this type of
attack, it may be possible for an attacker to have differing levels of control, e.g. an
attacker may be able to gain control of vehicle subsystems without gaining control of
the entire vehicle. If the attacker is able to gain complete control of a vehicle, there
is a possibility of a man-in-the-middle attack. In this attack, the attacker would send
falsified data to the original controller to make it appear that the vehicle is behaving
normally, when it is actually being controlled by the attacker. Such an undetectable
attack is especially dangerous.
Vehicle Destruction
In some cases, the attacker’s intent may be simply to destroy the vehicle. It is
possible for an attacker to have sufficiently limited control over one state that they
cannot perform a meaningful control acquisition attack, but still have the capability
to destroy the vehicle. For instance, if the attacker has control of the altitude of the
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vehicle they may command the aircraft to fly into the ground. However, the primary
area of danger, and thus the focus of this analysis for vehicle destruction attacks,
will be the introduction of instability into the control and navigation system of the
vehicle. An instability in these critical systems will result in a crash.
4.1.2 Failure Criteria
To evaluate whether a cyberattack has been successful, a criterion for failure
must be established. Based on the attack intents described above, we identify two
failure modes, the flight envelope failure and the mission envelope failure. In order to
quantify the severity of an attack, we use the time elapsed when any of these failure
criteria were met, referred to as time till failure.
Flight Envelope Failure
Flight envelope failure is defined as failure of the vehicle airframe, which typically
leads to destruction of the vehicle. The failure criteria is quantified using the angular
rates of the vehicle, which are a rough approximation of the wing loading that would
cause structural failure. Currently, 33% of all UAS system failures are caused by the
UAS exceeding its designed flight envelope [61]. UAS flight envelope enforcement is
a strategy for fail-safe recovery that can be used to mitigate attacks [61–63].
Mission Envelope Failure
Mission envelope failure is defined as violating the stated mission requirements of
the UAS. The UAS state can be compared to the mission requirements to determine
if the mission envelope has been violated. For this study, we selected mission require-
ments representative of a UAS reconnaissance mission, which should be similar to the
requirements for other mission types. The mission envelope parameters identified in
this study are summarized in Table 4.1.
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Table 4.1: Mission Envelope Parameters
Mission theater Geographic region to which the UAS is confined
Altitude window Range of acceptable vehicle altitudes
Battery/fuel level Required reserve battery power and fuel
Target window Area within which the vehicle must be during the
specified time
Target time window Time requirement for the target window
Flight envelope Flight envelope to avoid airframe failure
4.2 Attack Models
Several different types of attacks were identified and are presented in Table 4.2.
Table 4.2: Single Attack Types
Attack type Description
fuzzing attack Introduction of extra noise to sensor data.
actuator attack Physical modification of actuators.
update rate attack Slowing the processing rate of the controller/navigator.
navigator state attack Modification of the on-board navigator state.
sensor spoofing attack Providing false sensor data.
disguised attack An attack masquerading as another attack.
undetectable attack An attack that can’t be detected.
When only one attack avenue is pursued in an attack, it is considered a single
mode attack. The complete list of identified single mode attacks is given in Table 4.3.
A total of 37 different attacks were identified and incorporated into the vehicle model
presented in Chapter 3.
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Table 4.3: Single Attacks Considered
Attack Description
Digital Update Rate Frequency at which the navigator and controller
is updated
Actuator Effectiveness Decrease effective range motion for the throttle,
elevator, or rudder








Amplitude of injected sinusoid in GPS lat/lon/alt
measurement
GPS Lat/Lon Noise Increase noise in GPS position measurements
GPS Altitude Noise Increase noise in GPS altitude measurement
GPS Velocity Noise Increase noise in GPS velocity measurements
IMU Gyro Noise Increase noise in IMU gyroscope measurements
IMU Accel Noise Increase noise in IMU x-axis accelerometer
measurements




Scale north, east, or down velocity measurements
X Accelerometer Gain Scale x-axis accelerometer measurement
P/Q/R Gain Scale roll, pitch, or yaw rate measurements
True Velocity Gain Scale true velocity measurement






Modify estimate of north, east, or down velocity
Lat/Lon Offset Modify estimate of latitude or longitude
Altitude Offset Modify estimate of altitude
When multiple single mode attacks are used on a target simultaneously, it is
considered a combined attack. Successful combined attacks are especially dangerous
because they give an attacker additional degrees of freedom with which to achieve
their objective. If an attack can be intelligently designed, these additional freedoms
can be used to amplify the effect of the attack, reduce the detectability of the attack,
or achieve a result that is not possible with a single attack. The time till failure
metric presented above and the fault detection time will be used to determine the
effectiveness of the attack, which is function of how effectively failures are introduced,
how easily the attack is detected by the fault detection system, and how effective the
fault detection system is at preventing failures by reverting to the trim inputs.
4.3 Attack Injection
Inserting the attacks in the SIL testing is easily done, given the flexibility of the
block diagram modeling environment. The desired attacks can be inserted using
simple blocks or by modifying the initialization script for the simulation. An example
attack is shown in Figure 4.1.
Attack insertion in the HIL testbed is more difficult. For sensor and actuator
attacks, the HIL testing script can be modified to allow for the manipulation of the
simulated sensor measurements sent to the autopilot and the actuator state received
from the autopilot, as in the updated HIL data flow diagram in Figure 4.2.
Other attack types, such as navigator state attacks and a digital update rate at-
























Figure 4.1.: SIL Simulation Attack Injection
are more difficult to implement, as they require modification of the source code of
the software autopilot in order to implement the attack functionality. The imple-
mentation of these attacks would also require either compiling the software autopilot
for each individual attack or implementing attack control messages not supported by
MAVlink as well as the corresponding attack control logic. Given the complexity of
implementing this, these attack types are not considered in these initial results, and
the focus is on the sensor and actuator attacks.
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Figure 4.2.: HIL Simulation Data Flow with Sensor and Actuator Attack Injection
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5. SIMULATION RESULTS
5.1 Software-in-the-loop Simulation Results
The single mode attacks presented in Table 4.3 were simulated at varying input
magnitudes and every two pair combination was simulated, for a total of 703 simula-
tions. This simulation was performed in a 32 bit Ubuntu 12.04 virtual machine on a
64 bit Fedora 17 host using libvirt and QEMU. Selected results from this simulation
are presented in this section to highlight the usefulness of this analysis, with addi-
tional interesting results presented in Appendix A. An overview of the full results is
also presented.
In the selected results shown, the flight envelope and mission envelope failure
times are given for the system that implements the trim input reversion mitigation
policy and the system which does not implement any mitigation policy. This gives
an indication of how well the system is able to recover from the attack. The time at
which the fault is first detected is also given.
5.1.1 Throttle Effectiveness and Down Velocity Gain Attack Results
The first attack, shown in Figure 5.1, shows an attack that modifies the down
velocity gain and reduces the effectiveness of the throttle actuator. As can be seen in
Figures 5.1(a) and 5.1(b), this attack is effective at introducing failures in the system
with no mitigation policy. When these failures are compared to the fault detection
times in Figure 5.1(e), it is clear that a fault was detected before each failure occurred.
This attack is, accordingly, not a stealthy attack. This detectability greatly reduces
the effectiveness of the attack when performed on the system that implements the
trim input reversion mitigation policy, shown in Figures 5.1(c) and 5.1(d). This
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(a) Flight envelope failure time without fault
detection







































































(b) Mission envelope failure time without fault
detection






























(c) Flight envelope failure time with fault
detection



























































(d) Mission envelope failure time with fault
detection























































(e) Fault detection time
Figure 5.1.: Down Velocity Gain and Throttle Actuator Effectiveness Attack
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mitigation policy completely removes the ability of the attack to introduce flight
envelope failures, and it is only able to induce mission envelope failures. The mission
envelope failures are introduced occur at 70 seconds, which is the time at which the
vehicle is required to be at the destination waypoint. This would indicate that the
mission failures are due to an inability of the vehicle to correctly guide itself to the
waypoint. This behavior is expected since the mitigation policy suspends waypoint
guidance when a fault has been detected. This is therefore an example of an attack
that, while able to compromise an unprotected system, is fairly easily detected and
mitigated, and thus not particularly relevant.
5.1.2 IMU Gyroscope Noise and Down Velocity Gain Attack Results
The second attack, shown in Figure 5.2, uses the down velocity gain modification
as the attack in Section 5.1.1 but pairs it with a fuzzing attack on the IMU gyroscopes
to much greater effect. In this attack, the mitigation policy is largely ineffective, with
no meaningful difference in the failure times in the system that does implement the
mitigation policy in Figures 5.2(a) and 5.2(b) and the system that does implement it in
Figures 5.2(c) and 5.2(d). While the system may not be able to automatically mitigate
the attack, it does detect the fault for most attack values, as shown in Figure 5.2(e),
and will alert the operator to the presence of the attack. There is one isolated region
in the fault detection plot in Figure 5.2(e) in which no fault is detected before the
flight envelope is violated. Given that most of the other combinations of these two
attacks that cause failure are detectable within ten seconds, this combination attack is
particularly effective in that no fault is detected within the approximately 30 seconds
it takes to induce failure. The flight envelope of the vehicle will therefore have already
been violated by the time the automatic monitor can trigger operator intervention.
It is also noteworthy that the region of relative stability at unity down velocity
gain in Figures 5.2(a) to 5.2(d) shows that the gyroscope noise attack is not especially
effective on its own as it is unable to induce failure without being combined with
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(a) Flight envelope failure time without fault
detection
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(c) Flight envelope failure time with fault
detection
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(e) Fault detection time
Figure 5.2.: Down Velocity Gain and IMU Gyroscope Noise Attack
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another attack. Similarly, reducing the down velocity gain below unity is unable to
introduce a flight envelope failure without the addition of gyroscope noise, although
it is able to introduce a mission envelope failure.
The fact that these attacks are more effective at inducing flight envelope failure
when used together demonstrates the benefit to the attacker of coupling attacks. The
identification of productive couplings is a very difficult problem, however.
5.1.3 Results Overview
Through this simulation, several single mode attacks were identified as being par-
ticularly effective in general. These generally effective attacks were able to induce
failure to some degree either independently or in several of the possible two attack
combinations when used against the system implementing a detection and mitigation
policy.
Direct modification of the navigator state was a very effective attack. This is not
a surprising result, as the navigator state is used directly by the control systems in
determining the system input, so inserting a large error into that state can result
in a drastic change in the actuator state. These attacks are, however, usually easily
detectable. Because the fault detection system is updated more slowly than the
controllers, however, the vehicle was unable to recover when the fault was finally
detected. The modification of the a, b, or c components and to a lesser extent
the d component of the attitude quaternion was the most effective of the navigator
state attacks. This is also not surprising, as attitude errors are likely to produce
the strongest response from the control system. Additionally, the nonlinearity of the
attitude state can make it very difficult to correctly converge to the true attitude once
a sufficiently large error has been introduced. After the attitude state, attacks on the
latitude and longitude states were the most effective. Attacks on these states likely
excite the turning dynamics of the vehicle by introducing a new guidance solutions
based on the faulty position estimate. This excitation can be leveraged by other
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attacks to induce failure. Similarly, the introduction of phantom obstacles via ADS-
B, thus triggering avoidance maneuvers, is also an effective attack.
Attacks on all components of the velocity measurements and on the velocity com-
ponents of the navigator state were also particularly effective. The gyroscope and
accelerometer attacks were marginally effective, but less so than the other attacks
mentioned here.
5.2 Hardware-in-the-loop Simulation Results
5.2.1 Difficulties of Direct Comparison to SIL Attacks
This section will present the results of the HIL simulation along with a compari-
son to the SIL simulation results. These results are sometimes dissimilar. There are
several potential causes for this, one of them being that the higher-fidelity provided
by HIL testing gives more accurate results. Another potential source of this dissim-
ilarity is the minor differences in the autopilot design. Ideally, one of the simulation
configurations will be modeled directly after the other so as to provide more mean-
ingful results. For this testbed, however, the development of the SIL simulation was
performed before there was a low-cost, open source hardware and software autopilot
available that was suitable to analysis.
The most viable candidate platform at the time that the SIL testbed was devel-
oped was the ArduPlane software autopilot in conjunction with the Ardupilot-Mega
hardware autopilot [64]. This platform used the Atmel 8bit AVR microprocessor fam-
ily with an operating frequency of 16 MHz. This hardware is not powerful enough to
run a full extended Kalman filter-based navigator, and uses a robust direction cosine
estimator instead. Since this navigation scheme is not typical for unmanned systems,
detailed analysis of such a system is not applicable to UASs in general, and was not
considered.
The PX4 autopilot project that was eventually adapted for use in the HIL testing
was developed after the SIL testbed, and, although sizable code contributions were
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made by the FDC/HS Lab at Purdue, it was developed independently of this analysis.
Because these projects were developed separately, as well as the design limitation
in implementing an autopilot model in hardware compared to software, there are
differences between these largely similar systems. For example, the HIL testbed is
unable to use the same navigator and controller update rate as the SIL testbed, as the
overhead imposed the HIL messaging overhead consumes too much of the processing
capability.
Despite these differences, the SIL results are still a good predictor of a successful
attack in the HIL results. While exhaustive simulation of the identified attacks was
performed with the software testbed, this has not been done with the HIL analysis.
Instead, successful SIL attacks were repeated in the HIL testbed, generally with the
same success, validating the analysis.
5.2.2 IMU Gyroscope and X Accelerometer Gain Attack
Figure 5.3 shows the flight envelope and mission envelope failure times for the
software simulation of a cyberattack that inserts Gaussian noise into the IMU gyro-
scope measurements and adds a gain to the x-axis accelerometer. The results of the
hardware simulation for the same attack are shown in Figure 5.4.
While these two simulations have some pronounced differences, there are also some
significant similarities. The successful attack regions take the same general shape for
both simulations, with a failure region at accelerometer gains close to nominal and
large gyroscope noise in the corner of the plot, and a separate failure region towards
the center of the plot that is a combination of both attacks. The exact location of
these regions is different for both simulations, and the failure occurred much faster
in the hardware simulation. The differences between these simulations are difficult
to explain analytically, given the complexity of the systems, but that we were able to
use the SIL results to correctly identify which attack pairings were likely to produce a
40








































































(a) Flight envelope failure time without fault
detection















































































(b) Mission envelope failure time without fault
detection
Figure 5.3.: SIL IMU Gyroscope Noise and X Accelerometer Gain Attack






















































(a) Flight envelope failure time without fault
detection



























































(b) Mission envelope failure time without fault
detection
Figure 5.4.: HIL IMU Gyroscope Noise and X Accelerometer Gain Attack
failure in the HIL analysis and the overall similarities in the results serves to validate
the approach.
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6. FALSE DATA ATTACK FORMATION
This chapter extends the work of Liu et al. into false data injection attacks on air
traffic control systems [40] and investigates false data injection attacks in general
linear systems that use Kalman filter estimates to feedback on the system. False
data injection attacks have been identified as a particularly interesting attack in part
because of the comparative ease with which they can be performed. While the inter-
nal components of an autopilot can be directly monitored and protected, sensors are
often external and may not be as easily protected. This is especially true for remote
sensors which depend on data networks for communication, creating the possibility
network-based attacks such as man-in-the-middle or replay attacks [22]. Direct physi-
cal manipulation of a remote sensor, which may be less monitored or protected, is also
possible, as well as manipulations of the environment to change the sensor readings,
as in GPS or Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) spoofing [56,65].
Given the noise inherent in sensor measurements, it can also be difficult to distinguish
valid measurements from modified measurements. A sophisticated attacker can make
use of this to formulate a false data injection attack that is undetectable by vehi-
cle monitoring systems and therefore does not trigger the enforcement of an attack




The dynamics of the closed-loop system are modeled as in Equation (6.1), with
the subscript n used to denote the nominal (no attack) case.
xn [n+ 1] = Axn [n] + BKxˆn [n] + Bdw [n]
xˆn [n+ 1] = Axˆn [n] + BKxˆn [n] + L [n] rn [n]
rn [n] = Cxn [n] + Dv [n]−Cxˆn [n]
(6.1)
where x [n] ∈ Rn is the system state vector, xˆ [n] ∈ Rn is the system state esti-
mate, r [n] ∈ Rm is the estimator residual vector, and u [n] ∈ Rp is the system input
vector. The process and observation noises, w [n] ∈ Rp and v [n] ∈ Rm, respec-
tively, are assumed to be independent, zero-mean white noise processes such that
E
[
w [k] w> [j]
]
= δij = E
[
v [k] v> [j]
]
, where δij is the Kronecker delta. A ∈ Rn×n
is the discrete time system transition matrix, B ∈ Rn×p is the system input matrix,
C ∈ Rm×n is the system output matrix, and Bd and D are real-valued matrices of
appropriate dimension to map w [n] into Rn and v [n] into Rm. L [n] ∈ Rn×m is the
Kalman filter gain, as in Equation (6.2) where Q [n] ∈ Rn×n is the covariance of the
state estimate. In the closed-loop configuration shown, K ∈ Rp×n is an arbitrary
feedback gain matrix.
Q [n+ 1] = AQ [n] A> + BdB>d
−AQ [n] C> (CQ [n] C> + DD>)-1 CQ [n] A>
L [n] = AQ [n] C>
(
CQ [n] C> + DD>
)-1 (6.2)
In this analysis, the Kalman filter is assumed to have entered the steady state, L
and Q∞, as in Equation (6.3) prior to the onset of the attack. Because the error
covariance and the gain are dependent on the assumptions of the system model and
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not on the measurements, the estimator gain and calculated error covariance will not
change from these steady state values throughout the attack.









The instantaneous error in the state estimate, e [n], is given by the difference between
the estimate and actual value, x [n]− xˆ [n]. Because E [xˆ [n]] = x [n] in the nominal
case, the expected estimate error, e¯ [n], is 0.
System fault detection is performed using the χ2 fault detector described in
Section 3.1.2 in which the Kalman filter residuals, r [n], are statistically tested to
determine if they are normally distributed with zero mean and covariance Qr =(
CQ∞C> + DD>
)
as is expected under correct operations. If this is the case, the
residual test function g [n] = r> [n] Q-1r r [n] will have a χ
2 distribution, and the va-
lidity of this distribution can be tested by comparing g [n] to a detection threshold,
τ , which can be chosen to give desired detection probabilities or can be determined
experimentally. If g [n] is greater than this threshold, the hypothesis that it has a χ2
distribution is rejected, and a fault is determined to have occurred [55,66].
6.1.2 Attacked System
Attack Assumptions
For a false data injection attack, the following assumptions are made:
1. The objective of the attacker is to formulate the attack input to optimally
degrade some aspect of the system performance while not triggering a fault
state. Triggering a fault state permits the implementation of a mitigation policy
and alerts the user to the presence of the attack, both of which are assumed to
be detrimental to the attacker’s objectives.
2. The attacker has perfect knowledge of the system dynamics (A,B,C), con-
troller and estimator parameters (L,Q∞,K), and noise properties, (Bd,D).
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3. The attack occurs over a finite time interval from 0 to Ta.
4. The attacker has the ability to arbitrarily modify some or all of the system
measurements. This ability will be reflected in the attack availability matrix as
defined in Equation (6.4).
F = diag
([
i1 i2 . . . im
])
ik =
1, if measurements from the kth sensor are modifiable0 otherwise
(6.4)
To simplify the notation, this availability is not incorporated into the system
dynamics. Instead, the constraint (Im − F) a [n] = 0 is enforced at every time
step during the attack formulation.
The attack input, a [n] ∈ Rm is modeled as an offset to the measurements made
by the system as shown in the attacked system dynamics in Equation (6.5). The
system components in this attacked case are denoted by the subscript a.
xa [n+ 1] = Axa [n] + BKxˆa [n] + Bdw [n]
xˆa [n+ 1] = Axˆa [n] + BKxˆa [n] + Lra [n]
ra [n] = Cxa [n] + Dv [n] + a [n]−Cxˆa [n]
(6.5)
The full model of the system, including the attack input, is shown in Figure 6.1.
6.2 Optimization Problem Formulation
In seeking to develop the attack input as an optimization problem that conforms to
these assumptions, there are three system error functions that are of note. The state
trajectory, which is the difference between the nominal and attacked system states
and is necessary for the evaluation of the objective function, is given in Equation (6.6).
Similarly, the estimate trajectory error, which is needed to evaluate the time evolution
of the state trajectory error, is defined in Equation (6.7). Finally, the estimate error,
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Figure 6.1.: Block diagram of system with attack input
used in the evaluation of the expected residual test signal, is the difference between
the system state and the state estimate, and is shown in Equation (6.8).
∆x [n] = xn [n]− xa [n] (6.6)
∆xˆ [n] = xˆn [n]− xˆa [n] (6.7)
e [n] = x [n]− xˆ [n] (6.8)
The general optimization problem for determining the attack input that maximizes
the sum of the square of the state trajectory error is shown in Equation (6.9), where




∆x> [n] W′∆x [n]
Subject to:
1. Expected Estimate Error Dynamics
2. State Trajectory Difference Dynamics






For this analysis, the optimization variable, X is defined as in Equation (6.10).
ν (k) =
[




ν (0) ν (1) . . . ν (Ta)
]> (6.10)








In 0n 0n 0n,m
])
(6.11)
An expanded weighting matrix W = blkdiag
([
W′ . . . W′
])
is also defined. The
objective function for this optimization problem, θ, can then be defined as in Equa-
tion (6.12)
θ (X) = X>S>WSX (6.12)
It is noted that if W′ is chosen to be positive semidefinite, this is a convex function.
6.2.2 Error Constraints
The evolution of the expected estimate error is given by Equation (6.13).
e¯ [n+ 1] = Ae¯ [n]− La [n] (6.13)
The expected difference dynamics are given in Equations (6.14) and (6.15) where
AC = A + BK − LC. It is noted that the observation and process noises are not
dependent on the attack input and provide the same contribution to the attacked
trajectory as they would to the nominal trajectory and therefore do not have an
effect on the difference. These terms are accordingly not random variables. It is also
noted that if the contribution of these noises are not identical, the expectation of the
differences will give the same result.
∆x [n+ 1] = A∆x [n] + BK∆xˆ [n] (6.14)
∆xˆ [n+ 1] = AC∆xˆ [n] + LC∆x [n]− La [n] (6.15)
47
These dynamics, along with the attack availability constraint, can be incorporated
into the problem formulation by defining the constraint matrix Γ in Equation (6.16).
Γ1 =

−In 0 0 0
0 −In 0 0
0 0 −In 0
0 0 0 Im − F
 , Γ2 =

A BK 0 0
LC AC 0 −L
0 0 A −L








Γ1 0 0 . . . 0
])
(6.16)
By applying the affine constraint in Equation (6.17) during the attack determina-
tion, the state and state estimate trajectory error dynamics, expected estimate error
dynamics, and attack availability constraints can all be enforced.
ΓX = 0 (6.17)
6.2.3 Residual Constraint
To reduce the likelihood of the attack being detected, the attack input should be
constrained so as to maintain a minimal profile. Because the χ2 fault detection scheme
uses a threshold comparison test on the residual test signal, g [n] = r>a [n] Q
-1
r ra [n],
the expected value of the signal, g¯ [n] should be constrained to be below a design
threshold, τ ′ during the attack formation. This design threshold should nominally be
less than the threshold value used in the fault detection system, τ . This will ensure
that the expected operation of the system under attack will not trigger a fault state,
although variation in the actual value g [n] may expectation of the test signal will not
trigger a fault state with some leeway for the variations of that test signal.
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In evaluating the expected value of this residual test signal, the time evolution
of the estimate error autocorrelation is one term that is needed. This parameter is
given in Equation (6.18).




d − LDD>L> − LCe¯ [n] a> [n] L>
− La [n] e¯> [n] C>L> + La [n] a> [n] L>
= Q∞ + e¯ [n+ 1] e¯> [n+ 1]
(6.18)
The residual test signal then can be formulated as a function of the attack input
as in Equation (6.19).





























A sparse, positive semidefinite matrix, Λk, can be defined for every k ∈ [0, Ta] such
that g¯ [k] = X>ΛkX + m. Making use of the Schur compliment and noting that
Q-1r is positive definite and C
>Q-1r C − C>Q-1r QrQ-1r C is positive semidefinite, Λk
can be shown to be positive semidefinite. The residual constraint function defined








 , Ψ (X) ≤ 0 (6.20)
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6.2.4 Quadratically Constrained Quadratic Program
The functions defined in these previous sections can be combined to form the
quadratically constrained quadratic program problem given in Equation (6.21).
Minimize: − θ (X)
Subject to:
1. Ψ (X) ≤ 0
2. ΓX = 0
(6.21)
This the minimization of a concave objective function subject to quadratic con-
straints. Without further development of the problem, a local minimum is therefore
not, in general, a global minimum. If (X∗, λ∗, µ∗) is a solution to the dual problem
of the primal problem in Equation (6.21) as stated in Equation (6.22), then that
solution satisfies the KKT conditions in Equation (6.23) in addition to satisfying the
constraints of the primal problem [67,68].
g (λ, µ) = inf (−θ (X) + λΨ (X) + µΓX) (6.22)
Because this problem generalizes similarly to that investigated by Liu et al., these
requirements are of the same form [40].
λ∗ ≥ 0
λ∗>Ψ (X∗) = 0




This analysis was applied to an example continuous time system with eigenvalues




1.0000 0.1000 0.0050 0.0002
−0.0007 0.9998 0.0991 0.0049
−0.0200 −0.0071 0.9746 0.0957
−0.3929 −0.1461 −0.5023 0.9076













 , C =
1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0





The steady-state Kalman filter gain was used for this system, as well as the LQR







 , K =
−1.9434 −2.0965 −1.7853 −0.2128
0.3209 −0.0277 0.0447 −0.3600
 (6.25)





 , W′ = diag ([1 0 0 0]) (6.26)
It is noted that because this system does not have an unstable eigenvalue, it does not
satisfy a necessary condition for a perfectly attackable system. [39] There will therefore
not exist an attack sequence A with a bounded attack input at every instant that will








The goal of this attack will accordingly be to degrade system performance and not
to insert unbounded state error.




















Figure 6.2.: Optimal attack input for example system
The attack input for this system was determined by numerically solving the opti-
mization problem formed in Section 6.2.4 using the MATLAB fmincon function and
the sequential quadratic programming algorithm. This input is shown in Figure 6.2.
A comparison of the nominal and attacked state trajectories for the system given
this attack input are shown in Figure 6.3. As can be seen, the performance of the
system is considerably degraded by the attack, with large steady-state oscillations
being introduced.
The value of the residual test signal throughout this simulation is shown in Fig-
ure 6.4. The designed expected value of this is test signal, τ ′, was chosen to be 50.
As can be seen in the plot, the actual values of this signal over the attack window
are centered about this designed value. By choosing this design threshold to be suf-
ficiently smaller than the actual detection threshold, the attack can go undetected.
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(a) Nominal system state






















(b) Attacked system state
Figure 6.3.: State trajectory comparison under false data injection attack




















Figure 6.4.: Optimal attack input for example system
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7. CONCLUSION
A methodology for analyzing the vulnerabilities of unmanned aerial systems to cy-
berattacks targeting the control systems has been presented. This methodology uses
a combined hardware and software simulation testbed to simulate UAS operations
under such cyberattacks. Different types of attacks and intents have been identified,
as well failure conditions and severity metrics. These attacks were simulated in differ-
ent combinations and different magnitudes in order to identify particularly effective
attacks and attack combinations that are able to successfully leverage their coupled
dynamics to increase their effect on the vehicle. Particular focus was paid to attacks
that are able to induce failure in the system without triggering detection systems, as
an attack that is not detectable is able to avoid the effects of any fault mitigation
policy that may be implemented by a system. Identifying attacks that are able to go
undetected also serves to determine the efficacy of these monitoring systems. Specific
attack cases were presented, as well as general results. These results can be used
to determine which aspects of the system are most vulnerable to malicious tamper-
ing and require additional protection. Additionally, the testbed has been designed to
easily accommodate new vehicle models, allowing the analysis to be performed for ad-
ditional vehicles. When used in combination with traditional cybersecurity analysis,
this analysis constitutes a comprehensive computing and control approach to security
that closely mirrors the dual nature of the cyber-physical systems themselves.
Additionally, a model of false data injection attacks on linear systems that use
Kalman filters to implement feedback was presented. This model was used to formu-
late an optimization problem that identifies the optimal false data injection attack
on a subset of available sensors that can be input into the system to maximize the
weighted state trajectory error relative to the nominal state trajectory. Constraints
were placed on this attack to limit the expected value of a residual test signal to
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be less than a designed threshold, enabling the attack to go undetected by vehicle
monitoring systems. This provides an easy method to identify the worst case false
data injection attacks and evaluate system performance in that case. The system
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Figure A.1.: B Quaternion Navigator State Offset and Digital Update Rate Attack
62













































(a) Flight envelope failure time without fault
detection













































(b) Mission envelope failure time without fault
detection













































(c) Flight envelope failure time with fault
detection













































(d) Mission envelope failure time with fault
detection





















































(e) Fault detection time
Figure A.2.: B Quaternion Navigator State Offset and Rudder Actuator
Effectiveness Attack
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Figure A.3.: Down Velocity Gain and ADS-B Injection Frequency Attack
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Figure A.4.: GPS Longitude Injection Amplitude and GPS Longitude Injection
Frequency Attack
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Figure A.5.: Altitude Navigator State Offset and Down Velocity Gain Attack
66
0 1 2 3 4 5

















































(a) Flight envelope failure time without fault
detection
0 1 2 3 4 5

















































(b) Mission envelope failure time without fault
detection
0 1 2 3 4 5

















































(c) Flight envelope failure time with fault
detection
0 1 2 3 4 5

















































(d) Mission envelope failure time with fault
detection
0 1 2 3 4 5











































(e) Fault detection time
Figure A.6.: IMU Gyroscope Noise and GPS Velocity Noise Attack
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Figure A.7.: D Quaternion Navigator State Offset and GPS Velocity Noise Attack
68






















































(a) Flight envelope failure time without fault
detection
























































(b) Mission envelope failure time without
fault detection






















































(c) Flight envelope failure time with fault
detection
























































(d) Mission envelope failure time with fault
detection

































(e) Fault detection time
Figure A.8.: East Velocity Gain and IMU Gyroscope Noise Attack
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Figure A.9.: D Quaternion Navigator State Offset and IMU Accelerometer Noise
Attack
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Figure A.10.: Latitude Navigator State Offset and IMU Accelerometer Noise Attack
71



































































(a) Flight envelope failure time without fault
detection





























































(b) Mission envelope failure time without fault
detection



































































(c) Flight envelope failure time with fault
detection





























































(d) Mission envelope failure time with fault
detection






































(e) Fault detection time
Figure A.11.: Longitude Navigator State Offset and IMU Accelerometer Noise
Attack
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Figure A.12.: D Quaternion Navigator State Offset and Down Velocity Gain Attack
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Figure A.13.: Latitude Navigator State Offset and Down Velocity Gain Attack
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Figure A.14.: Longitude Navigator State Offset and Down Velocity Gain Attack
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Figure A.15.: D Quaternion Navigator State Offset and East Velocity Gain Attack
76























































(a) Flight envelope failure time without fault
detection





















































(b) Mission envelope failure time without fault
detection























































(c) Flight envelope failure time with fault
detection





















































(d) Mission envelope failure time with fault
detection

























(e) Fault detection time
Figure A.16.: Longitude Navigator State Offset and X Accelerometer Gain Attack
